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This paper surveys the state of Canadian economic policy in two key areas: 
pensions and health care. The occasion for this volume provides one justi-
fication for what might appear an over-ambitious survey. The impressive 
range of topics that David Slater h as tackled over his career includes 
important work in both areas. In view of his consistent attention to the big 
picture and the long term in his work, it seems probable that if Dr. Slater 
were just starting now, the festschrift he could look forward to in 60 years’ 
time would make reference not just to his contributions to understanding and 
management of pensions and health systems separately, but also to their 
complementarities and interactions. 
                                                             
I thank Patrick Grady, Malcolm Hamilton, Jack Mintz, Finn Poschmann and 
Andrew Sharpe for comments and queries on an earlier draft, and Shay Aba for research 
assistance and helpful discussion. Remaining defects are my own responsibility. 
As government involvement in pensions and health care in Canada has 
expanded, a second reason for exploring the two topics together has become 
more compelling. Pensions and health care are major spending programs that 
are strongly related to the life cycle of citizens. An aging population and rising 
ratio of program beneficiaries to workforce participants presents each with 
important challenges. And, especially in the face of demographic changes, 
design issues in each and in their interaction need attention if Canada is to 
provide beneficiaries with money and services while encouraging behaviour 
that will support a strong economy and keep the programs sustainable.  
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There are, of course, also key contrasts. Income support through 
pensions is formally closely tied to old age, whereas many government-
supported health services are available on much the same terms throughout 
life. Pensions are money income, whereas health-related indemnity payments 
are relatively small relative to the services that are provided in kind. These 
contrasts affect the targeting of benefits and give provider groups a different 
influence on policy. As this review will attempt to show, however, these 
contrasts are often questions of degree rather than kind, and do not prevent 




The Three Pillars Framework 
 
For Canadians, there is one further justification for attempting a parallel 
discussion of pensions and health care. Commentary on pensions around the 
world makes much use of a metaphor of three pillars in describing a 
comprehensive system: a safety net to guard against destitution in old age, a 
mandatory employment-related system to provide basic replacement income, 
and a voluntary system supported by provisions that reduce double-taxation 
of saving. The distinction among different objectives of pension programs 
that inspires this metaphor is helpful in evaluating the performance of national 
systems (World Bank, 1994; ACPM, 2000). 
In Canada, the main elements of public policy related to pensions — the 
Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement (OAS/GIS) and 
various provincial transfers for low-income seniors; the Canada and Quebec 
Pension Plans (CPP/QPP); and tax rules and regulations related to employer-
sponsored and individual retirement saving plans (RSPs) — address these 
different objectives with an efficacy and precision that many other countries 
might envy. 
 
The same precise matching of objectives with instruments, however, is 
not evident in health care. The 2000 federal election campaign provided a 
vivid example of Canadians’ preoccupation with a confused debate over 
public versus private financing and public versus private provision of health 
services.
1 So a joint survey that discusses health care with respect to the three 
                                                             
1This confusion is partly deliberate, with advocates for government-produced 
services arguing that private production goes with private financing. In fact, physician services 
in Canada are nearly exclusively privately produced, as are the bulk of inputs such as drugs 
and laboratory services. Hospitals are still nominally independent not-for-profit organizations,  
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objectives that inspire the pillars metaphor — a safety net for those who need 
it, a contributory system that obliges those who can provide for themselves 
up to a basic level to do so, and a voluntary system that reduces double-
taxation of saving  — might accomplish two things. It might facilitate 
constructive responses to the pressures that will confront Canada’s health 
system in the future. And it might illuminate some interactions between the 




Outline of the Paper 
 
The rest of the paper has four main parts. The first part provides back-
ground. It gives an overview of the pillars’ concept, discussing its application 
to pensions and health care, and outlining the implications of each pillar’s 
objectives for the way it is financed.
2 It also discusses the challenges of 
Canada’s current situation, in particular the aging of the population and the 
need to ensure that the incentives the pension and health-care systems create 
— both individually and together — are compatible with long-term sustain-
ability. 
                                                                                                                                        
although many would argue that they have become de facto arms of provincial health 
ministries. 
2Some commentary uses the term “tiers” to distinguish different elements of pension 
systems (Robson, 1997). In connection with Canadian health care, however, the term “tier” 
has become so politically charged as to inhibit intelligent discussion. So it seems prudent to 
forestall some of the more reflexive, less reflective reactions by avoiding the word. 
The second section turns to a more detailed discussion of the pillars of 
Canada’s pension system, covering the motivations of the programs, their 
financing, recent developments and future prospects. The third section 
discusses health care in the same framework. 
The fourth section draws out some parallels between the two systems, 
discusses gaps in our understanding of how they affect behaviour, and 
speculates about how future policy changes, especially in health care, may 
affect their interaction. One observation is that more pre-funding to cover the 
cost of the aging baby boom is desirable, both in government budgets 
generally and in specific pension and health programs. A second is that 
gradual increases in the normal age of eligibility for pension benefits makes 
sense, and to the extent that health benefits become available at the same age, 
a coordinated approach would be desirable. A third major point is that 
allowing the current generous and largely non-means-tested health system to  
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evolve into an equally generous but strongly means-tested system would 
exacerbate disincentives for many Canadians to work and save; creating a 
second pillar in the health system is likely a better route to long-term sustain-
ability. Similar considerations underlie a fourth recommendation: creation of a 
new type of saving vehicle that provides tax-relief on distributions rather than 
contributions, so that modest-income Canadians can save in a form that 
avoids the high marginal effective tax rates that means-tested pension and 
health programs will otherwise impose on them. 
In summary, parallel treatment of pensions and health in the three-pillars 
framework highlights some useful steps Canadians can take to ensure that the 




Concepts and Context 
 
This section gives an overview of the pillars concept: the objectives of each 
pillar and their implications for its design and financing. It also discusses the 
challenges of interactions among elements of each pillar and between the 
pillars themselves. It then surveys the continuing transformation of Canada’s 
population to older, more intensive users of the pension and health systems, a 
transformation that makes decisions about how the pillars of each system will 




Classifying different elements of public policy towards transfer payments and 
in-kind services in the pillars framework is useful because it forces attention 
to their different motivations. 
 
The First Pillar: The Safety Net.  The first pillar is most straightforwardly 
thought of as a safety net. Like social assistance and in-kind services for the 
destitute, first-pillar programs seek to protect citizens from circumstances that 
are so miserable as to threaten life itself, or would be widely regarded as 
intolerable. 
From a traditional public finance point of view, government involvement 
in safety net programs arises for two main reasons.
3 In the case of the 
                                                             
3Rosen et al. (1999, chs. 10 and 9) provide a helpful overview of positive and 
normative considerations in these areas.  
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currently needy, such as the disabled, free-riding may prevent a private 
charity providing support on the scale that collective utilitarian motives would 
suggest. And in the case of potential recipients, who would insure themselves 
against disaster if they could, information failures — adverse selection and 
moral hazard — may prevent private insurers from providing the necessary 
coverage.
4 Students of public choice will point out also that actual and 
potential recipients of such programs have an interest in voting for them, as 
do actual and potential providers of services and transfer inter-mediaries. 
Design of safety net programs inevitably requires trading off competing 
imperatives. One key question is the level of support. Programs that are 
relatively generous will relieve hardship more effectively. Their higher 
expense, however, will typically impose efficiency costs through the tax 
system. More generous programs are also likelier to raise concerns about 
horizontal equity, both between less fortunate members of society who do or 
do not qualify for the program, and between those who do or do not pay for 
it. 
Targeting, whether through means-testing (by income, or assets, or both), 
provision of in-kind services,
5 or characteristics such as age that serve as 
proxies for need, is also a key conundrum. Programs that are broadly targeted 
are likelier to provide support to all intended beneficiaries and will reduce 
incentives to change behaviour to create entitlement. Narrowly targeted 
programs, by contrast, are likelier to exclude people who are not intended to 
benefit. They thus make less acute the efficiency and horizontal equity issues 
just noted, and  — to the extent that targeting is accomplished through 
providing services in kind — respond to paternalistic desires to constrain the 
use recipients make of their support. 
Their redistributive motivation makes first-pillar programs strong 
candidates for financing from current general government revenue. Pay-as-
you-go tax financing reflects the dual nature of judgements about deprivation. 
                                                             
4Adverse selection refers to the fact that potential insurers against mis-fortunes with 
a likelihood closely bound up in the personal characteristics of the potential buyer typically 
know less about the likely payout than the buyers do themselves. They may, therefore, only 
be able to offer policies at average prices that will be unattractive to the best risks, with the 
result that no market develops. Moral hazard refers to the possibility that purchasers of 
insurance will change their behaviour in ways that increase the likelihood of a claim, but which 
the insurer cannot observe — another obstacle to widespread provision by private insurers. 
5For an exploration of type 1 and type 2 errors — inadvertently excluding intended 
beneficiaries and inadvertently including unintended ones — as factors in the design of 
redistributive programs, see Boadway and Keen (2000).  
188  William B.P. Robson 
Most people would not wish relief of absolute deprivation — a level of well-
being so low as to threaten life itself — to be contingent on the existence of, 
say, a pool of dedicated income-earning assets. Giving such relief a high-
priority claim on general public sector resources makes sense. Deprivation is 
also a relative concept, however: the material living standards of the average 
Canadian family four generations ago would be widely regarded as intolerable 
for a poor person (particularly a poor, elderly, sick person) today. Gearing 
support for safety net programs to current general prosperity through pay-as-
you-go financing makes adjusting its level as society-wide living standards 
change relatively straightforward. 
These considerations do not rule out pre-funding these obligations 
indirectly by raising governments’ net worth through general budget sur-
pluses. If the rate of return on financial assets exceeds the rate of economic 
growth, pre-funding new or enriched programs will impose lower taxes for a 
given level of benefits.
6 In situations where an initiative is intended to transfer 
resources from the young to the old and/or from a presumably more 
prosperous future to a needier present, however, policymakers and potential 
recipients may not give that consideration much weight. 
 
The Second Pillar: Mandatory Income/Lifestyle Maintenance.  The second 
pillar is a mandatory contributory social insurance system that requires all 
eligible citizens to purchase a basic package of benefits, such as insurance 
against unemployment. Traditional public finance perspectives stress two 
reasons for extensive government involvement in such systems. 
One of them is moral hazard created by the first-pillar safety net. It is 
hard for administrators of safety net programs to deny benefits to people 
whose deprivation is of their own making. Such judgements are always 
contentious, and when the deprivation results from irrevocable past choices, 
the desire to set a good example for others may be too weak to produce time-
consistent policy. So it is attractive to force all who could provide for 
themselves at least up to the level of first-pillar support to do so. 
Even if the safety net did not affect behaviour and people would be 
willing to buy insurance against misfortune at an actuarially fair price, adverse 
selection may mean that such insurance is not widely available. Individuals 
                                                             
6Moving an ongoing program from a pay-as-you-go to a pre-funded footing is a 
trickier call. In present value terms, the first-round impact of such a change imposes costs on 
losers that are equal to the benefits to winners, making second-round impacts and judgements 
about the appropriate sharing of costs and benefits among generations key to the decision 
(see Sinn, 2000, on the inter-generational point).  
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are worse off without a kind of insurance they would like to buy, and their 
defensive behaviour may have further adverse consequences.
7 Compulsory 
pooling overcomes this difficulty. As far as efficiency is concerned, it is not 
clear that the gains from compulsory pooling outweigh the cost of increasing 
the scope for moral hazard to operate within the second-pillar system. 
Deductibles and co-payments can curb moral hazard, however, and if a desire 
to shift costs among participants is a key motive for establishing a social 
insurance program. The resulting externalities are an intentional product of 
policy. 
Another often-cited justification for second-pillar programs is that 
individuals may judge their needs poorly. They might, for example, be 
myopic, underestimating their future requirements and failing to save enough 
on their own. They might save in inappropriate forms. Or recipients might 
respond to plans that provide unrestricted indemnity payments rather than 
restricted ones or in-kind services by spending foolishly. Whether policy-
makers are better at looking after participants’ interests than the participants 
would be on their own is bound to be a matter of debate. Since compulsory 
participation on similar terms is a general feature of social insurance 
programs, experiments that would allow judgements about, say, relative time 
horizons among private and public decisionmakers tend not to occur. 
The financing of second-pillar systems reflects their insurance aspects. 
Most such plans collect contributions from participants (often through their 
employers) whose benefits are related in some fashion to their history in the 
plan. Many second-pillar systems can produce records of individual 
participation that resemble those that private insurers would provide. To the 
extent that participants see their contributions as actuarially fair  — no 
different, say, from deductions from pay to finance fringe benefits — they 
will impose no tax and provide no subsidy, promoting an efficient labour 
market. 
This mimicking of private insurance policies or retirement plans does not 
typically extend to the handling of assets inside the plan. The usual approach 
is a government-administered fund. If such a fund is administered separately 
from other government assets and liabilities, and the program’s cash flows are 
segregated from other items in a government’s budget, there may be 
economically meaningful pre-funding of the program’s obligations. As noted 
earlier, such pre-funding may be desirable when returns on financial assets 
                                                             
7A frequently provided example is the possibility that without insurance against 
unemployment, over-hasty job-search will impede good matching of employer needs and 
employee skills.  
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exceed economic growth rates or — as is likelier with second- than first-pillar 
programs — when policymakers wish to keep each cohort’s costs in line with 
its benefits. At the other extreme, the fund may be a meaningless 
bookkeeping entry that signifies no segregation of plan cashflows and assets 
from the rest of the government’s budget — a misleading mask on a pay-as-
you-go system. 
 
The Third Pillar: Tax-Recognized Saving.  Third-pillar systems are sets of 
tax laws and regulations that provide a framework for individuals, either on 
their own or pooled (generally through employers), to self-insure.
8 Their key 
feature is relief from double-taxation of saving. There are two principal 
approaches. The more common one exempts contributions to and earnings 
within a saving plan from the tax base, but includes distributions. This 
approach is often referred to as EET — for “exempt”, “exempt” and “taxed”. 
The other, less often used, includes contributions to a plan in the tax base, but 
exempts accumulations and distributions. This approach is often referred to as 
TEE. 
From a public finance point of view, these systems serve several ends. 
They reduce distortions in the current-salary/deferred-benefit balance of 
employee compensation by evening out the tax treatment of, say, pension-
plan contributions and wages.
9 Relatedly, they mitigate the bias that a pure 
income tax creates in favour of consumption over saving (see Mintz, 2001). 
Although such plans may pay taxes or receive subsidies, they are usually self-
funding. Tax deferral in third-pillar systems also promotes horizontal equity 
by making it easier for private sector employees to obtain pension and 
insurance arrangements like those enjoyed by public sector employees, whose 
employers — being formally or effectively non-taxable — find provision of 
generous deferred benefits less costly. They can also level the playing field 
between employees and the self-employed. 
The voluntary nature of these systems weakens the case for restricting 
the services that participants can buy or the indemnities they can enjoy. 
Nevertheless, paternalism in third-pillar systems finds expression in regula-
tions that, for example, attempt to ensure that saving ostensibly undertaken 
for retirement is actually used for that purpose. 
                                                             
8The presumption here is that contributions to such plans are from participants 
themselves, although the possibility of government top-ups exists. 
9If the third-pillar framework promotes employer-sponsored or other private 
pooling arrangements that have an insurance element, it can reduce the problems that public 
finance economists point to in justifying second-pillar programs.  
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From a public choice point of view, third-pillar plans might be seen to 
respond to the desire of citizens for deferred compensation under their own 
control. Some observers see the forward-looking behaviour such control 
induces as a source of positive externalities, and count this effect as a benefit 
of such plans. A less favourable assessment, typically reflecting a view that 
annual income is a suitable metric for assessing well-being, sees these plans as 
undermining vertical equity — allowing savers, who in a given year will tend 
to have higher incomes than non-savers, to avoid tax on part of their incomes 
— and may consider some kind of quid pro quo on the part of participants, 





As this brief review reveals, programs in each pillar present challenges: the 
first pillar’s trade-off between generosity and efficiency; the second pillar’s 
overcoming of adverse selection at the cost of increasing the scope for moral 
hazard; the third pillar’s conflict between horizontal and vertical equity. The 
fact that developed democracies typically have a number of programs that 
provide safety-net, social insurance, and self-insurance services, moreover, 
means that sorting out the combined impacts of and interactions among 
different programs can be a major challenge. 
 
Interactions.  Where first-pillar benefits are geared to assets or income, for 
example, problems can arise when benefit-reduction schedules — popularly 
known as clawbacks — affect a given recipient overlap. The “welfare wall” 
encountered by people moving from social assistance to work who lose 
various transfer payments and in-kind benefits is a well-known instance. 
Interactions among different pillars are also important. If clawbacks in first-
pillar programs create confiscatory marginal effective tax rates, for example, 
they will hurt incentives to work and save in general. Discouraging work is 
unhelpful to the contribution base for second-pillar programs, while an 
expectation of higher marginal effective rates in retirement may outweigh the 
encouragement that third-pillar programs provide for individuals in the 
relevant income range to save. 
Finally, interactions among entire systems can matter. If the income and 
substitution effects of systems in one area discourage workforce participa-
tion, for example, the consequent reduction in output will adversely affect the 
financing of other systems.
10 Alternatively, improvements in well-being as a 
                                                             
10The lower workforce participation may have implications for the spending side of  
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Demographic Change and Fiscal Sustainability.  Of course, the functioning 
of pillars and the interactions among them occur in real time, and the evolu-
tion of these programs and the changing circumstances that surround them 
have tended to confront countries with specific types of challenges. 
The second half of the twentieth century was remarkable for a number of 
developments in the developed democracies. The first 25 years were a period 
both of rapid productivity growth that gave rise to unprecedented prosperity, 
and of dramatically higher fertility amid a long-term downward trend. 
Governments grew rapidly, with first- and second-pillar programs playing 
major roles in the expansion. Then the second 25 years witnessed a reversion 
to the historically normal growth rates and a resumption of the previous trend 
towards fewer children. 
Canada shared in this experience. The boom gave rise to economic 
growth rates well in excess of rates of return on financial assets, encouraging 
pay-as-you-go financing and government deficits. The expansion of 
government obligations and an end to the productivity boom then created 
large fiscal deficits. When the historically more common situation where rates 
of return on financial assets exceed economic growth rates returned, high debt 
levels kept tax rates up even as program spending came under control. Ever 
since, accumulating obligations in the areas of both pensions and health care 
have created concern about fiscal sustainability and inter-generational fairness 
(Robson, 1996, pp. 3-4 and 7-9). 
The central fact underlying current concern about Canadian pension and 
health systems is that the aging of the baby boom and the post-boom return 
to a longer term downward trending fertility rate is on the verge of changing 
the ratio of older to working-age Canadians in a massive, unprecedented 
fashion. Over the years from 2000 to 2020, the share of the total population 
that is 65 or over will go from its current level of 12.5 per cent to more than 
18 per cent, while the ratio of working-age people to seniors will drop from 
                                                                                                                                        
other programs as well. 
11Interactions that help shape the parameters of the systems are also possible. For 
example, Bethencourt and Galasso (2000) investigate the possibility that redistribution 
through public health expenditures will increase the size of the constituency that supports 
redistribution through the pension system.  
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5.5 to 3.6.
12 More speculatively, with constant fertility rates and age-specific 
mortality rates continuing to decline at the rates suggested by experience from 
1971 to 1991, the share of the population that is 65 or over will rise to 25 per 
cent, and the ratio of working-age people to seniors will fall to 2.4 by 2040 
(Robson, 2001, pp. 4-6). 
Since the older population is likelier to receive payments and services 
from the pension and health systems, while the working-age population is 
likelier to contribute to them, Canada’s fiscal and economic future will be 
highly sensitive to the interactions and overlaps among the various pillars of 







The current structure of Canada’s retirement income system conforms 
closely to that suggested by the pillars framework. The safety-net, mandatory 
income-replacement, and voluntary components of the system are easily 
distinguishable. These separations have assisted Canadians in adjusting these 
programs in the past, and should prove helpful in making adjustments that 
will keep the system functioning well in the years ahead. 
 
 
Old Age Security and the Guaranteed Income Supplement 
 
Together, Old Age Security (OAS) and Guaranteed Income Supplement 
(GIS) payments make up the bulk of the income-supporting safety net for 
older Canadians.
13 
The OAS was Canada’s first national income-support payment for the 
elderly. It started as a modest flat transfer to all Canadians aged 70 or over in 
the early 1950s, grew in real value through enrichment and lowering of the 
eligibility age  to 65, and then shrank again through inflation until being 
                                                             
12Consistent with the usual labour-force definition, the working age is defined here 
as from 15 to 64. 
13The spouses’ allowance introduced in 1975 also falls under this heading, but is 
too small to rate separate discussion. See Burbidge (1996) for a fuller description of these 
programs and their history.  
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indexed to the consumer price index in the early 1970s. It is taxable and since 
1990 has been subject to a special clawback of 15 per cent that reduces it to 
zero for seniors with net incomes above about $80,000. 
The GIS was introduced in the mid-1960s as a non-taxable income 
supplement for Canadians who would receive little or no benefit from the 
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans (CPP/QPP) established at the same time. 
It was enriched at intervals during the 1980s, and is indexed to consumer 
price inflation. It is clawed back at a rate of 50 cents per dollar of (most) 
other income.
14 
The OAS and GIS are clearly first-pillar programs, providing a floor 
below which no senior’s income will go. They are largely responsible for the 
virtual elimination of severely low incomes among Canadian seniors (Osberg, 
2001). Together, they represent a compromise between the objective of a 
lightly distorting, but less generous, universal safety-net program, and the 
more heavily distorting and more generous alternative. The durability of this 
compromise was evident when the 1996 federal budget proposed to combine 
the two programs into a new “seniors benefit” that would have enriched 
benefits marginally at the lower end and clawed back transfers to higher-
income recipients more energetically. This proposal attracted a number of 
criticisms, among them dislike of the higher effective marginal tax rates it 
would  have imposed on middle-income seniors (Slater, 1998), and was 
quietly dropped in the summer of 1998. 
The OAS originally had some trappings of a contributory plan, with a 
notional allocation from both the personal and corporate income taxes into a 
dedicated account. For some early participants, this cosmetic gesture created 
a sense that the transfer was an earned entitlement along second-pillar lines. 
These earmarked taxes and the account disappeared in the early 1970s, 
however. Since then, the OAS and the GIS have been financed from general 
federal taxation — a pay-as-you-go approach that gives these programs a 
high-priority claim on core government resources and effectively gears them 
to general prosperity. Since the ratio of federal government debt to gross 
domestic product (GDP) has risen from around 20 per cent in the mid-1970s 
to more than 50 per cent currently — and the last enrichments of the GIS in 
the mid-1980s occurred when the federal deficit was running around 8 per 
cent of GDP  — this financing approach can be reasonably seen as a 
deliberate transfer of resources from the young to the old. 
Looking ahead, two contrary forces affect the claim of these plans on 
national resources. The more rapid growth of the recipient than the working-
                                                             
14Importantly, OAS payments are not included.  
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age population will exert upward pressure on OAS and GIS payments as a 
share of the economy. But since benefits are indexed to prices rather than 
wages, productivity growth tends to reduce their share of GDP. Recent 
projections from the Chief Actuary (OSFI, 1999) showed expenditures under 
these plans falling from around 2.6 per cent of GDP at the time to 2.4 per 
cent after a decade, then climbing again, regaining their then-current share by 
2015, and peaking at 3.3 per cent of GDP by 2030.
15 
Discounted over the next 50 years at 6 per cent, the net increase in the 
share of GDP projected to flow through these plans represents a liability of 
about 9 per cent of GDP.
16 The fiscal consolidation that has brought the ratio 
of the federal government’s net debt to GDP down by nearly 20 percentage 
points from its peak above 70 per cent in the mid-1990s might be seen as, in 
part, a move to offset this liability and the associated resources transfer. 
Except for the aborted seniors benefit just mentioned, the only significant 
attempt to rein in growth of the first-pillar programs was a proposal in the 
1985 federal budget to limit the indexation of OAS payments to inflation over 
3 per cent — a measure also dropped in the face of opposition from seniors. 
Many observers have suggested that the increase in the average healthy life 
expectancy of Canadians since these programs were introduced makes it 
reasonable to expect people to work for longer, and that some increase in the 
age of eligibility for receipt would make sense. Although many developed 
democracies, including the United States, have recently undertaken or 
scheduled such moves (OECD, 1998, p. 53), no such moves are currently in 
view in Canada. 
One equity-oriented concern about the generosity of the OAS/GIS system 
is that, especially combined with provincial supplements, it provides an after-
tax income guarantee that is quite high relative both to the safety nets 
available to younger Canadians and to the levels at which working individuals 
                                                             
15The Chief Actuary illustrated the potential impact of ad hoc increases to keep the 
generosity of these programs more closely in line with the income of the working population 
by calculating that indexing benefits to inflation plus 60 per cent of the difference between 
wage growth and inflation would raise the ratio of their expenditures to GDP by about 
two-thirds of a percentage point above the base case by 2030 (OSFI, 1999, pp. 86 and 
102). 
16Fifty years is roughly the average life expectancy of every living Canadian. A 6 
per cent nominal interest rate is equal to the roughly 4 per cent real interest rate used by the 
Chief Actuary in the most recent projections for the CPP, plus the 2-per cent inflation rate 
specified in the Bank of Canada’s targets. This rough-and-ready valuation is used for the 
sake of consistency with the valuation of the health-care liability below (as in Robson, 2001).  
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and families begin paying taxes (ACPM, 2000, pp. 12-13). With indexation to 
prices rather than wages eroding the relative value of these payments, and 
increases in tax thresholds and reductions in bottom tax rates easing the 
burden on lower-income workers, these concerns will likely become less 
acute over the next few years. For the foreseeable future, then, the first pillar 
of the Canadian pension system is unlikely to change significantly. 
 
 
The Canada and Quebec Pension Plans 
 
The Canada and Quebec Pension Plans are second-pillar programs: manda-
tory social insurance, income-replacement plans that cover most employed 
Canadians.
17 They provide a variety of benefits: a retirement pension that, at 
the normal retirement age of 65, starts at roughly one-quarter of covered 
earnings; widow and orphan benefits; disability benefits; and a small death 
benefit. Contributions are levied as a proportion of earnings between $3,500 
and the lower of actual earnings and a maximum roughly equal to the 
industrial average. Participants receive periodic statements of their status in 
the plans, and benefits are linked, albeit somewhat loosely, to contribution 
history. 
The CPP/QPP have many trappings of funded plans, but they were 
originally intended to be largely pay-as-you-go. The CPP began paying full 
benefits after a decade in operation, and although the QPP’s phase-in was 
two decades, the larger pool of assets this delay allowed was desired more for 
industrial policy and provincial-government financing purposes than to secure 
the benefits of pre-funding (Vaillancourt, 2000, p. 24). The assets under 
administration in both plans were dramatically short of the actuarial liabilities 
of the plans by the mid-1990s, and since the CPP’s assets were at that time 
almost exclusively provincial government debt paying below-market rates of 
interest, one can argue that there was no economically meaningful pre-
funding at all. 
The fact that the CPP does have some assets under administration, 
however, meant that when financial market returns moved back above 
growth rates in the 1980s, the plan’s financial projections readily highlighted 
the advantages of pre-funding. As at year-end 1997, the Chief Actuary 
estimated the total accrued entitlement of the CPP’s participants to date at 
                                                             
17The principal exceptions, as is common in this type of plan, are for certain 
government employees: members of the armed forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police are not required to belong.  
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$465 billion, versus assets of $37 billion, for a funding ratio of about 8 per 
cent, and an unfunded liability of $428 billion (OSFI, 1998, p. 191). The 
Quebec government does not produce comparable actuarial valuations of the 
QPP, but if the ratio between the QPP and CPP liabilities is proportional to 
the respective covered populations, the unfunded liability of both plans at the 
end of 1997 would have been $566 billion. 
By the mid-1990s, concern that the existing plan would require contribu-
tion rates above 15 per cent by 2030 inspired action to shore up the CPP. 
The reform package implemented in 1998 trimmed benefits slightly and 
ramped up the contribution rate markedly. The actuarial projections on which 
the reforms were based suggest that the CPP’s funding ratio will rise to about 
20 per cent over the next 20 years, allowing the contribution rate to stay at a 
politically palatable 9.9 per cent of covered earnings for the foresee-able 
future.
18 The package also created an arm’s-length CPP Investment Board 
(CPPIB) to manage the CPP’s assets, an institution that represents a state-of-
the-art a ttempt to deal with some of the well-documented problems of 
government-run provident funds (Slater, 1997b; Robson, 1998). 
The 1998 reform package also provided for more frequent reviews of the 
CPP’s financial state than previously.
19 More frequent scrutiny will encour-
age faster adjustments in the face of adverse developments. The assumptions 
underlying the 1998 reform package were reasonable on the whole, and 
positive surprises, with regard to productivity growth, for example, are 
possible. Importantly, however, inflation of 3 per cent — significantly above 
the Bank of Canada’s target of 2 per cent  — was needed to make the 
package work. Moreover, the formula used to calculate the “steady-state” 
contribution rate will, even if the projections on which the 1998 package was 
based are borne out, tend to yield higher rates during the next few reviews,
20 
                                                             
18A coherent theoretical case can be made that the additional saving in the 
CPP/QPP will be offset by reduced saving outside it, and that the reform package will 
therefore produce no net increase in national saving. As Pesando (2001) notes, however, 
such an offset is unlikely in actuality. 
19The results of the first triennial review will be out shortly after this volume is 
published. 
20The current formula for calculating the “steady-state” rate is an odd one. It 
specifies essentially that the rate should make the ratio of CPP assets to annual expenditures 
the same 63 years after the evaluation date as it is 13 years after it. Since the asset-
expenditure ratio peaks between those two dates — and therefore is on its way up at the 13-
year mark and on its way down at the 63-year mark — the next few evaluations will use 
progressively higher 13-year benchmarks for the ratio, and will therefore find that higher  
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increasing the chances that one of them will inspire fresh ideas about better 
funding the plan. Further reforms are not beyond the realm of possibility in 
the coming decade, and proposals to raise entitlement ages (see Pesando, 
2001) can and should get a hearing. 
More frequent review  — especially following a strong economic 
performance such as occurred during the 1998–2000 period — might also 
expand the opportunity for enriching current or soon-to-be beneficiaries at the 
expense of later participants. Another threat to the plan’s integrity may be 
industrial-policy advocates attracted by the growing pool of financial assets 
under CPPIB administration. Importantly, however, the CPP Act provides 
for other provinces to follow Quebec’s lead and establish their own plans, and 
the province of Alberta has shown interest in doing so if the principles of the 
reform package are threatened, a threat that may help keep the package 
intact. To the extent that confidence among younger CPP participants that 
they will actually receive future benefits remains low, repackaging part of the 
plan into individual retirement accounts may be an attractive option (Robson, 
1996; Pesando, 1997). 
 
 
Pension Plans and RRSPs 
 
The modern shape of Canada’s registered pension plans emerged from two 
forces. One was the desire to ensure that private employer-sponsored pension 
plans were properly funded. The other was the desire to level the playing field 
between employees who had such plans and those who did not. Accom-
plishing these goals meant removing the obstacles to employer funding of 
pension plans, and then providing analogous provisions for individuals who 
wished to contribute to their own. 
The essential characteristic of Canada’s third pillar is that it relieves 
contributions to employer-sponsored or individual retirement plans from 
current taxation, and does the same for income earned inside the plans. With-
drawals are taxed at regular personal income tax rates. 
Concern about the possibility that higher income earners will avoid too 
much tax on contributions, as well as the federal government’s fiscal 
difficulties in the mid-1990s, resulted in limits on contributions that in recent 
                                                                                                                                        
contribution rates are needed to push the 63-year ratios up to that level (Slater and Robson, 
1999, pp. 14-15). Of course, another possible reaction to this problem would be to change 
the regulation that specifies the formula, and choose two new dates that yield a 9.9 per cent 
rate.  
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years have become tighter.
21 Withdrawals from and conversions of the assets 
in these plans into annuities or combined return-on/return-of capital arrange-
ments (registered retirement income funds) are regulated in several ways and 
are obligatory after age 69. 
As noted already, a key rationale for relieving contributions to pension 
plans from current taxation is that failing to do so would discourage 
employers from funding their pension promises. Passing the bill for the first 
cohort of recipients  forward in time through pay-as-you-go financing is 
attractive to private companies as well as to governments, but unless growth 
in company revenues and profits out-paces returns on financial assets 
indefinitely, such arrangements tend to lead to defaults. Unfunded private 
defined-benefit plans have essentially been illegal since the 1960s; nowadays, 
the obligations of defined-benefit plans are by and large completely backed by 
assets. Full backing of defined contribution plans, whether employer-
sponsored or individual, is of course intrinsic to their structure. 
In general, the third pillar of Canada’s pension system appears, like the 
other two, to be well suited to its purpose of facilitating voluntary retirement 
saving. Slightly over one-half of Canadian families have claims on defined-
benefit plans (Statistics Canada, 2001), and some one-third of Canadians 
have Registered Retirement Saving Plan (RRSP) assets. Contributions to 
contributory Registered Pension Plans (RPPs) dropped somewhat between 
1986 and 1997, but increased contributions to RRSPs more than offset the 
decline (Morissette and Drolet, 2001, p. 115). By international standards, the 
assets held in Canada’s third-pillar Registered Saving Plans (RSPs) are large, 
amounting to some $730 billion, or almost three-quarters of GDP, in 2000 
(Andrea Davis, 2001). 
There is ongoing debate over the justification for RSP contribution limits. 
Those who dislike seeing individuals with higher annual incomes defer tax 
tend to argue for lower limits, an argument that has recently carried the day. 
The maximum contribution for which tax deferral is available has been frozen 
at the lesser of 18 per cent of income or an amount sufficient to provide 
$1,722 per year of pensionable service (to a maximum of 35 years) for 
                                                             
21See Slater (1997a). Income-tax provisions concerning Canadian RSPs limit 
foreign investments by their owners. This restriction is unusual among developed countries, 
and seems to reflect a view that those enjoying deferred taxation should pay a price for the 
privilege. If binding, such limits can force savers into inferior risk-return positions (Fried and 
Wirick, 1999). For large plans with cost-effective access to derivatives, circumventing these 
limits is easy and inexpensive; for small individual savers, on the other hand, vehicles offering 
above-the-limit foreign exposure tend to be relatively costly.  
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defined-benefit pension plans, and 18 per cent of income or $13,500 annually 
for defined-contribution plans or RRSPs. After allowing for inflation over the 
period of the freeze (1996 to 2004), these provisions will reduce the 
opportunity to save 18 per cent of income in this manner to individuals with 
annual incomes under about twice the average, although unlimited carry-
forwards of unused room reduce the impact of these limits on taxpayers 
whose incomes are volatile (Slater, 1997a). Those who favour consumption 
taxation, on the other hand, tend to favour higher limits (Mintz, 2001), and 
many would also favour liberalization of the terms under which funds from 
these plans can be withdrawn.
22 
A further area of concern that has, as yet, attracted less attention relates 
to the fact that income-based means-testing in the pension system’s first pillar 
— and, as is discussed further below, in the health-care system — results in 
marginal effective tax rates for modest-income older Canadians that are 
typically far higher than the tax rates they faced while working (Davies, 
1998). For these people, especially when they are older and the period of tax-
free accumulation is less significant, EET-type vehicles that defer taxes may 
be an unwise choice (Shillington, 1999). 
To judge from current behaviour, the implications of this problem are not 
yet clear to many of those affected: the share of income devoted to pension 
contributions increased more among low- than high-income workers from 
1986 to 1997 (Morissette and Drolet, 2001, p. 116). Many of these 
contributors, especially the younger ones, are undoubtedly people whose low-
income status is temporary. For those whose long-term prospects for income 
gains are not good, however, the disadvantages of saving in this form raise 
two concerns. First, it would make sense to create a TEE-type vehicle, in 
which contributions would be taxed but accumulations and withdrawals would 
be tax-free, in which lower income Canadians could more effectively save 
(Kesselman and Poschmann, 2001). Second, if more of the lower income 
population comes to understand the implications of high future-
clawback/current-tax-saving ratios and save less as a result (as Hamilton, 
2001, suggests they should), the first-pillar system and the taxes that pay for 




                                                             
22Age limits on receiving pensions or converting the assets in a plan to an annuity or 
Registered Retirement Income Fund would also need re-examining in the event of an increase 
in eligibility ages in the first- and second-pillar systems.  




In contrast to the pension system, the formal organization of Canadian health 
care scarcely reflects a three-pillar framework. It is nevertheless straight-
forward to distinguish safety-net, mandatory basic lifestyle maintenance, and 
voluntary saving motivations behind different components in the system. 
Distinguishing these components is helpful for two reasons. It breaks the 
system’s successes and challenges down more clearly than does the confused 
debate over public versus private financing and delivery that currently 
dominates health-care discussions. And it highlights features of the health-care 




Coverage against Medical Catastrophe 
 
Public financing of hospital treatments and other responses to life-threatening 
conditions is the clearest mechanism by which Canadian health systems 
provide safety nets to citizens. Hospital insurance was the first area of 
extensive public financing of health care in Canada, being brought almost 
entirely into a system where services are free at the point of delivery, with no 
co-payments or deductibles, by the early 1960s. Hospitals remain both the 
single biggest category of public health expenditures and also the category of 
health expenditures in which the share of public money is largest.
23 Both 
motivations for safety-net programs — ensuring that free-riding does not limit 
the resources available for rescue, and compulsory pooling to provide 
insurance of a type that adverse selection and moral hazard make it difficult 
for private insurers to cover — are evident in this arrangement. 
Since the early 1970s, most physician services have also been effectively 
part of the safety net. Like hospital treatments, physician services have first-
dollar coverage under provincial medicare plans. To a lesser but still con-
siderable extent, many services that are ancillary to hospital and physician 
treatments, in particular laboratory services and pharmaceuticals, often come 
into the safety-net category. But the extent to which this type of coverage 
corresponds to what most people would think of as safety-net functions is 
                                                             
23Figures on the public and private shares of health spending by use of funds are 
available from the Canadian Institute for Health Information at 
<www.cihi.ca/facts/nhex/nhex2000/NHEX_Fig1-5.shtml#figure%205> (as of 10 July 2001).  
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erratic: while patients’ hospital stays are covered, the ambulance that takes 
them there may not be. 
For the most part, Canadian safety-net health services are targeted only in 
the implicit sense that, after the point of first contact — the primary-care 
physician, walk-in clinic or hospital emergency room — their provision is 
contingent on a medical condition that warrants treatment. Unlike the 
common practice in other countries, access to hospital and physician services 
in Canada is not subject to means-testing and there are no mechanisms for 
cost-recovery after the fact. 
Some targeting of first-pillar-type services, however, does exist. Tax 
credits for out-of-pocket medical expenses provide full relief from taxation of 
income devoted to health care above specified limits (3 per cent of net 
income or a prescribed amount, $1,637 in 2000) for people in the bottom tax 
bracket, but less than full relief for those in higher brackets. The provinces 
that still charge health-related premiums — British Columbia and Alberta for 
hospital, physician and pharmaceutical services; Nova Scotia for pharma-
ceuticals alone — provide partial or complete relief from premiums based on 
factors such as age, income, or medical condition. Access to provincial 
pharmacare programs is also contingent on age, income and/or medical 
condition.
24 And importantly for subsequent discussion, public subsidies for 
long-term care are typically subject to income-based means tests and fierce 
clawbacks. 
When hospital and physician services were first covered by public 
insurance programs, individual or family premiums notionally related to the 
insurance programs were common. As with the OAS, this approach appears 
to have responded to a sense in the population that these were, to some 
extent, second-pillar-style contributory programs.
25 In many cases, these 
provincial revenues were directed into special accounts, and the terminology 
of pre-payment suggested at least a minimal level of pre-funding. 
Federal subsidies to the provinces — at first under cost-sharing agree-
ments and later through block-funding — were always from general revenues, 
however, and over time, provincial health programs became largely or 
completely tax financed. Nowadays, as just noted, only Alberta and British 
Columbia charge premiums in respect of hospital and physician services, and 
                                                             
24Drug plans for seniors typically involve income-tested co-payments and 
deductibles. 
25The fact that packaging them this way enabled governments to levy special taxes 
to cover their costs made the fiscal decisions easier.  
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the amounts raised amount to some one-eighth to one-tenth of health-
envelope spending.
26 As with first-pillar pension programs,  it seems 
reasonable to view the increase in provincial government net debt — from 
around 5 per cent of GDP in the early 1970s to around 27 per cent more 
recently — as indicative of an implicit desire to transfer resources to current 
recipients of these services. 
Tax-financed medical services that are a de facto part of the Canadian 
safety net currently amount to some 6 per cent of Canada’s GDP. Because 
older people absorb medical services in larger amounts than younger people,
27 
the intensity of their use will likely rise in the future even as the number of 
working-age Canadians so important to their financing grows more slowly and 
then shrinks. Unlike the price-indexing that provides some automatic offset to 
the upcoming shrinkage of the share of the population that is working, most 
observers expect current trends to increase the cost to taxpayers of the health 
safety net. 
Projections that assume constant relative age-specific utilization rates, 
moderate increases in age-adjusted utilization and costs, and historical 
increases in output per person of working age suggest that the claims of 
provincial health spending on the economy will rise markedly in the coming 
decades. Expressing these increases over current shares of GDP — or equiv-
alently, if governments’ tax shares of GDP stay constant — over current 
own-source revenues in present-value terms over a 50-year period yields a 
measure of the liability represented by higher health spending ranging from 
$500 to $800 billion (Robson, 2001, pp. 11 and 16).
28 Although governments 
have reduced their debt-to-GDP ratios since the mid-1990s, the de facto pre-
                                                             
26In 1999–2000, Alberta raised $653 million in health-care insurance premiums, 
and spent $5.1 billion in the “health and wellness” envelope (Alberta, 2001). In British 
Columbia, medical services plan premiums were $868 million, and $8.1 billion was spent 
under health (British Columbia, 2000, pp. 79 and 81). In Alberta, premiums are collected by 
large employers. Certain categories of citizens are exempt from premiums, including seniors in 
Alberta; low-income families in both provinces are eligible for lower premiums. 
27Estimates from the Canadian Institute for Health Information for 1998 show per 
capita use of provincially funded health goods and services some 5.4 times higher for those 
65 and over than for those under 65 (Robson, 2001, pp. 4-5). 
28Projections that assume that mortality, rather than age per se, is the key driver of 
costs produce figures that are somewhat more challenging. In a typical projection, the number 
of deaths rises more slowly than the number of seniors, but more quickly than a utilization-by-
age weighted index of the entire population.  
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funding provided by these reductions is fairly small alongside a liability of 
some 50–80 per cent of GDP. 
The fiscal pressures of the 1990s resulted in some narrowing of the 
variety of medical services covered by the tax-financed safety net, and mostly 
informal quantitative limits on the supply of covered services. The current 
period of buoyant fiscal results has eased these pressures but, while there is 
doubtless room for more efficient use of resources in the system through 
more adept planning (Evans et al., 1994; Donaldson et al., 2001b) or internal 
markets (Jérôme-Forget and Forget, 1998; Donaldson et al., 2001a), it is safe 
to predict that they will mount again in a few years’ time. 
When they do, the outcome of choices about what services to continue 
covering in the tax-financed system will doubtless largely reflect the same 
desire to protect Canadians against catastrophic events — which, if paid for 
privately, would be financially ruinous — that led to hospital and physician 
services being covered publicly in the first place. The process of choosing 
might be somewhat less contentious if the safety-net motivation behind this 
pillar were more explicit in the debate. Age will doubtless continue to be a 
criterion for eligibility for certain types of services; a straightforward way of 
adjusting this type of targeting to cope with financial pressure and 
acknowledge the trend towards longer life expectancy and healthier old age 
would be to raise the eligibility age for such coverage.
29 
As far as moves towards means-testing are concerned, the dilemma 
familiar from the discussion of first-pillar systems generally and the OAS/GIS 
system in particular — between providing a generous level of support and 
avoiding punitive effective tax rates — will come to the fore. Thus far, the 
fierce clawbacks that generous but tightly targeted safety-net programs create 
have been mostly limited to the area of long-term care, where they already 
create powerful incentives not to save or to convert assets to forms that are 
immune from clawbacks. The recent increase in the importance of drugs in 
treatments means that provincial drug programs, which typically gear 
deductibles, co-payments and (where they exist) premiums to income, 
increasingly raise the same type of concern. 
More general co-payments geared to income are one possible response to 
financial pressure. Recovering part of the cost of medical services through the 
personal income tax (Reuber, 1980, ch. 8) would be less problematic than 
adding to the existing panoply of income-tested benefits. Provided that the 
                                                             
29It would be more elegant if eligibility ages for pensions and health care rose in 
tandem. Since both systems are essentially areas of shared federal-provincial jurisdiction, 
some lead by the federal government would be necessary in both areas.  
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recovery was at the same tax rates that would apply to individual income in 
the relevant range, such recoveries would push some taxpayers into higher tax 
brackets, but would not create effective marginal effective rates higher than 





As just noted, when health “premiums” were relatively more important in 
funding hospital and physician services in Canada, one might have argued that 
these programs reflected, at least in part, second-pillar motivation. The public 
systems had replaced private not-for-profit pre-paid insurance, with the 
explicit objective of making coverage universal and compulsory.
30 In this 
respect, Canada might have been said to have a second-pillar system that 
provided medical services in kind, funded on a largely pay-as-you-go basis by 
individual and family levies. 
By now, most publicly funded services are financed almost completely 
from general revenue.
31 The sort of second-pillar system that is common in 
other countries  — by which people who are able to protect themselves 
against foreseeable health risks are obliged to do so in either a social insurance 
program or through mandatory private insurance — scarcely exists in Canada. 
There are, however, examples of this type of program: workers’ 
compensation programs, sickness benefits under the employment insurance 
(EI) program, and the disability components of the CPP/QPP. 
With the exception of workers’ compensation programs, which purchase 
medical benefits that they provide their participants in-kind — effectively a 
little-noticed second tier within the publicly funded system  — Canada’s 
second-pillar programs essentially provide indemnity payments: income 
replacement in the event of ill-health. About three-quarters of workers’ 
compensation expenditures are indemnity payments, and EI sickness and 
CPP/QPP disability benefits are entirely provided in cash. 
                                                             
30Taylor (1978, ch. 6) discusses the gradual displacement of non-government 
insurers of physician services after the coming into force of the Medical Care Act in 1968. 
31Newfoundland, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec levy payroll and other taxes with 
names that include the word “health”. This, however, is no more than an attempt to make 
these taxes more palatable to the population: they are in no sense hypothecated for health-
related spending, and there is no link (as there still is in provinces that charge premiums for 
certain health services) between payment of the levy and access to health services.  
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All three of these programs are run exclusively by governments, and 
depart in important ways from insurance principles. Workers’ compensation 
programs, which are financed exclusively through payroll taxes levied on 
employers, resemble insurance programs most closely in that they are 
partially experience-rated on the basis of employers’ accident records, and 
have de facto deductibles in the form of waiting periods.
32 EI and CPP/QPP 
are financed by taxes on wages and salaries the obligation for which is 
formally split between employers and employees: neither is experience-rated 
in any meaningful way, and neither has co-payments.
33 The two-week 
waiting period for sickness benefits under EI constitutes a token deductible; 
the four-month waiting period for CPP disability benefits constitutes a more 
substantial one. 
For the most part, these programs have been run on a pay-as-you-go 
basis. By the mid-1990s, all three had sizeable unfunded liabilities. Part of the 
concern over Canada’s fiscal predicament at that time was directed at these 
liabilities, with the result that workers’ compensation programs have become 
better funded, the EI program has built up a substantial cumulative surplus, 
and the CPP and QPP are, as noted already, on a path to partial funding.
34 
Canada’s second-pillar system is unusual in international terms, both in its 
relative thinness, and in i ts exclusion of private insurers. While workers’ 
compensation in the United States, for example, is a state monopoly in some 
                                                             
32Being provincial programs, they pool risk over smaller populations than the EI 
program, but involve less chronic regional cross-subsidies that does EI. 
33The EI program’s provision of longer benefit periods in high-unemployment 
regions acts, in fact, as a kind of reverse experience-rating. There is a special clawback of EI 
payments to higher-income earners through the personal income tax. 
34On the wisdom of fuller funding for workers’ compensation programs, see 
Vaillancourt (1995, p. 84); and Bogyo (1995). CIA (1996); and Robson (1996) were 
among the advocates of a more fully funded CPP. The EI program is a more debatable 
example of fuller funding. The contribution the EI Account has made to the federal 
government’s fiscal turnaround since the mid-1990s is so large — a cumulative swing of 
around $33 billion since 1995, during which time the entire reduction in federal debt has been 
only $26 billion — that it seems unlikely that the turnaround could have occurred without it. 
For that reason, one might regard it as incremental saving. A contrary view, however, would 
see the fiscal turn-around as driven by necessity: if the EI program had not played its part, 
other parts of the budget would have made up the difference. For that reason — and noting 
also that the EI account is consolidated with the rest of the budget and its assets are simply 
federal debt — one might argue that there is no meaningful pre-funding in the program.  
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states, it is provided by private or a mix of private and public insurers in most 
(Thomason, 1995, p. 59). Many European countries and Japan go much 
further, obliging most or all citizens to enroll in sickness funds that pool risks 
by industry, geographic area, occupation, and/or in self-selected categories.
35 
These programs have safety-net features — they often provide relief from 
premiums, deductibles and/or co-payments to those with low incomes, and 
there is coverage from general government revenues for treatments too 
expensive for the normal insurance system to cover — but in much of the 
world, the second pillar represents the principal source of health coverage for 
the typical citizen. 
Not surprisingly, given the state of Canada’s current debate over health 
care, there appears to have been very little discussion of the merits, or even 
the possibility, of establishing a second pillar in the health system. In the early 
1980s, the Canadian Medical Association floated a proposal that each 
Canadian family pay $1,000 a year in premiums to support what would have 
amounted to a substantial second-pillar system carved out of what is now the 
first-pillar system (Begin, 1984, p. 82). That proposal died a quick death, 
however; Canadians are largely unaware that their health system contains a 
second pillar, and do not — especially now that the last period of liberaliza-
tion of CPP/QPP disability benefits is well in the past — much debate the 
possibility of expanding it. 
                                                             
35See Globerman and Vining (1996, p. 25). The Swiss system is remark-able for 
its lack of conformity with much of the economic theory that justifies social insurance 
generally and a government monopoly on it particularly. Swiss ambulatory care insurance is 
privately provided, and not only differs by region within each canton, but offers a choice of 
four deductibles (with premiums adjusted accordingly) above the mandatory minimum 
(Schellhorn,  2001, p. 13). Japan mandates participation in medical insurance plans organized 
in a variety of ways, including employer-based plans financed from payroll taxes and regional 
(municipal) plans financed from income and wealth taxes (Blomqvist, 2001). 
Total indemnity benefits paid under workers’ compensation, EI sickness, 
and CPP/QPP disability are significant — at nearly $8 billion annually, they 
amount to close to 1 per cent of GDP, and equal about 13 per cent of the 
value of health services provided in-kind by provincial and territorial govern-
ments — and administrative practices have tended to increase the generosity 
of these systems over time. But the expansion of EI and CPP/QPP benefits 
related to health problems has rarely b een explicitly advocated as a 
supplement to or substitute for the general-revenue-financed safety net, and 
the possibility of their becoming significant buyers of health services along 
WCB lines would strike most Canadians as peculiar.  
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Another way of carving a second pillar out of part of the existing first 
pillar, and possibly out of part of the existing third pillar as well, would be to 
require Canadians not currently covered, or not well covered, by private 
insurance to buy more. Despite the extensive use of this approach abroad, 
this suggestion might appear beyond the pale in Canada’s current political 
climate — as was noted above, non-government insurance in Canada has 
been historically associated with the principle of voluntary purchase, and was 
supplanted by compulsory government coverage as a matter of policy.
36 But 
the Canada Health Act’s prohibition of private insurance extends only to 
coverage of services that are provided by provincial health programs. In that 
sense, there is nothing that would prevent a province from requiring, for 
example, that all citizens purchase a basic package of insurance for drugs, 
dental care, or other services outside the currently defined safety net. 
The usual justifications for preferring single public plans to competing 
private ones are the greater ease of integrating public plans with other public 
services (Vaillancourt, 1995, p. 83), the administrative costs of private plans 
(Evans et al., 1989), and the ability to hold costs down with monopsony 
power (Richards, 1997, pp. 123-124; Hurley, 2000). Against these 
advantages can be cited the benefits of competition among private insurers in 
providing better coverage at lower cost (Globerman and Vining, 1996, pp. 82-
83), and the advantages of involving the consumer of services more directly 
in treatment decisions — a motivation lying behind the suggestion that a 
mandatory second-pillar system might be organized around individual medical 
saving accounts.
37 The stakes in allowing such an experiment outside the 
safety-net system might seem sufficiently low to permit this type of approach 
in some of the more entrepreneurially minded provinces. 
A notable feature of Canada’s second-pillar health system is that — being 
either oriented around working people (workers’ compensation and EI) or 
providing benefits to working-age people and  seniors that are mutually 
exclusive (CPP/QPP) — it contains no provisions that are specific to the 
elderly.
38 As the Quebec Commission of Study on Health and Social Services 
                                                             
36It would have been possible, as is done in other countries, to subsidize low-
income purchasers of private insurance, but the federal government was unenthusiastic about 
such subsidies and designed its cost-sharing proposals to discourage them (Blomqvist, 1994, 
p. 409). 
37Ramsay (1998) presents some arguments for and against mandatory MSAs. 
Gratzer (1999, pp. 189-208) surveys a variety of options for MSAs, most of which are 
voluntary. 
38Although premium-based drug coverage for seniors is available in some  
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(the Clair Commission) recently noted, Canada is increasingly out of step with 
international practice in this regard.
39 The Clair Commission proposed a new 
provincial plan in Quebec that would cover a range of home and institutional 
care services  — providing either indemnity payments or buying services 
directly — for people suffering from long-term incapacity. The plan would be 
pre-funded from a dedicated tax on personal income, through an account 
administered by an arm’s-length body.
40 
 
Private Saving for Health-Related Consumption 
 
Turning to the third pillar, Canada’s tax system has no widespread systematic 
provisions relieving saving for health-related expenses from double taxation. 
This absence is not currently a major concern. The de facto incorporation of 
hospital treatments, physician services, and many drug and specific-disorder-
related expenses in the safety-net system, and the effective prohibition of 
private purchase of many of these services or insurance to cover them, makes 
dedicated saving vehicles a low priority for most people.
41 Indeed, the idea 
that there is a third pillar in Canada’s health system would strike many as a 
novel one. 
Nevertheless, a discernable third pillar does stand alongside the first and 
second pillars just outlined. Favourable tax treatment exists for some saving 
that is implicitly or explicitly for medical purposes. RSPs, for example, can 
clearly be used for medical expenses. Some health insurance pays for services 
that are essentially outside the safety-net system, such as dental care. Other 
                                                                                                                                        
provinces, there is no obligation to enroll. 
39The Clair Commission cited Austria, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Japan 
as examples of countries that established compulsory plans to fund various home support 
services, residential and long-term care services for the elderly (Quebec, 2000, p. 183). The 
most familiar example for Canadians is probably U.S. Medicare, which provides coverage 
for hospital services from a payroll-tax-financed trust fund similar in structure to the U.S. 
Social Security system. (This is Part A; Part B, supplementary medical insurance, is financed 
by user fees and general revenues.) 
40Quebec (2000, pp. 181-185). The commission left open the possibility that the 
new plan would cover all people suffering from long-term incapacity, rather than seniors only. 
41Around half of Canadians have at least partial insurance coverage for eye-wear, 
closer to 60 per cent have it for dental care, and around three-quarters have it for 
prescription drugs (CIHI, 2000, p. 21).  
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insurance provides complementary inputs, such as drugs. And — remarkably, 
in view of the reductionist all-or-nothing debate over public versus private 
financing — other insurance supplements services covered by the first pillar, 
such as semi-private or private hospital rooms, or by the second pillar, such 
as disability indemnities. 
As already noted, public policy might relieve saving for health-related 
expenses from double taxation for several reasons. Exempting employer 
contributions to health, life or disability insurance from taxation by allowing 
employers to deduct them as a cost of compensation but not including them 
in employees’ taxable income makes sense if the distributions from such plans 
are subject to tax (the EET model). Otherwise, employers will be discouraged 
from funding such plans, and private sector employees will be at a 
disadvantage relative to their public sector counterparts whose employers do 
not pay tax. Alternatively, governments might grant no tax relief in respect of 
contributions to such plans, but exempt distributions from tax (the TEE 
model). 
Some of Canada’s existing provisions for health-related saving conform 
to this motivation. Disability insurance, for example, is available in either EET 
or TEE form. As noted already, to the extent that RSPs are used for medical 
expenses, they fit the pattern as well. Other provisions, however, do not. 
Some vehicles, such as employer-paid health and dental insurance (and their 
equivalents for the self-employed), attract no tax on either contributions or 
distributions, and others, such as life insurance, are taxed only above certain 
thresholds or in part — although recent changes to the personal income tax 
have tended to reduce the importance of these exemptions.
42 
                                                             
42In passing, it bears noting that the treatment of social insurance premiums by the 
tax system reflects incoherent thinking about double taxation. Despite the fact that EI and 
CPP/QPP benefits are taxable, with the former also subject to a special clawback, the 
employee-paid part of the premiums is not deductible from income, but instead earns only a 
credit at the lowest tax rate. 
The financing of current contractual health-related saving does not raise 
any special concerns. Regulation and actuarial oversight of private defined-
benefit plans appears to be sufficient to ensure that they are properly funded, 
and defined-contribution plans by definition promise no more than they can 
pay. Because the safety-net component of Canadian health care is so broad 
and deep, employer-funded health plans are relatively modest, and the 
continuity of coverage of retirees in the event of an employer’s bankruptcy, 
which has been a concern in the United States, is less so in Canada. The 
prospect of a larger elderly population, however, and the inability of 
employers to tax-effectively fund post-retirement benefits, may result in 
pressure for more accommodative policies in the future.  
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Privately purchased health goods and services are quite important in 
Canada — at about 2.7 per cent of GDP, or $850 per person (CIHI, 2000, 
pp. 18-19) the private share of health spending is relatively high in 
international terms. It grew steadily during the 1990s while public spending 
was more constrained, and on recent evidence, it will continue to rise.
43 If this 
is so, and this increase is reflected in greater demands for saving vehicles 
related to health, at least two issues merit note. 
First, the RSP system already provides the infrastructure for a substantial 
expansion of the “indemnity” part of the health system’s third pillar. Such an 
expansion would be easier to achieve if long-delayed in-creases on the 
amounts of income for which tax sheltering is available finally came about. 
Liberalization of the provisions regarding withdrawals could also help convert 
RSPs into a third-pillar type of medical saving account.
44 
Finally, even without measures to facilitate its use for medical purposes, 
the rising stock of pension savings is a harbinger of an older population that is 
likely to be willing and able to pay for medical services that, while covered by 
the public safety net, are not available in a timely way or in a customer-
friendly setting. If the legislative response is to seek to erect tighter barriers to 
private provision, some likely short-term consequences will be more cross-
border shopping, recourse to the courts by patients and providers chafing 
under the restrictions, and under-the-table purchases. Longer term, some 
have questioned whether support for the current framework of medical care 
in Canada will erode among such a population (Globerman and Vining, 1996, 
pp. 38 and 66). 
 
 
Design Issues, Interactions and Challenges 
 
Looking at pensions and health care together highlights some key design 
issues, especially interactions between the pillars of the two systems that may 
                                                             
43There is some debate about the relationship between public and private spending 
on health care as revealed by international experience (Tuohy et al., 2001). Canada’s unique 
practice of prohibiting private insurance for, and effectively purchase of, services covered by 
the safety net, however, means that offsetting movements evident in other countries may be 
misleading as signals of what Canadians can expect, since publicly and privately purchased 
health services are less ready substitutes. 
44As is noted below, however, EET vehicles are not suitable for many modest-
income Canadians.  
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need attention as larger numbers of older Canadians draw more heavily on 
them, or contemplate actively the time when they will do so. 
 
 
Motivation and Design 
 
Starting with first-pillar systems, it is clear that the balance between 
generosity and tolerable marginal effective tax rates is easier to strike when 
policymakers are monitoring the combined effects of different safety-net 
programs. Like the “welfare wall” that eliminates immediate financial rewards 
from leaving social assistance for paid employment, overlapping income-
tested transfers in the pension system’s first pillar already subject low-income 
seniors in provinces such as Ontario to effective marginal rates of 100 per 
cent or even more. 
Income supplementation programs for the elderly are reasonably well 
monitored, and the decision to supply a fairly generous level of support at the 
cost of imposing punitive tax rates on those with private incomes below it, 
while open to question, can reasonably be regarded as a choice Canadians 
have deliberately made.
45 Absent policy changes, the projected evolution of 
the first-pillar pension programs offers some comfort in this regard — 
increases in other incomes are projected to increase the share of relatively 
lightly clawed-back OAS payments in the total from 77 per cent recently to 
83 per cent by 2030 (OSFI, 1999, p . 9), which will make the punitive 
effective tax rates under GIS less important. 
There is, on the other hand, very little monitoring of the health system’s 
impact. For more than 15 years, targeting of the safety-net health services has 
occurred almost exclusively through control of access to in-kind benefits. But 
there are areas where means-tested health services and subsidies are 
producing problems. In some provinces, income-tested drug and long-term 
care subsidies create marginal effective tax rates that, stacked atop other 
means-tested programs, impose confiscatory tax rates on the private income 
                                                             
45It is important not to overstate the coherence of policy in this area. Effective tax 
rates of over 100 per cent result from the calculation of the GIS clawback on the basis of 
grossed-up dividend income, which means that seniors such as GAINS recipients in Ontario 
experience marginal effective tax rates well over 100 per cent on dividend income. Lack of 
concern about this inequity among policymakers might be attributable to their supposition that 
few GIS recipients have dividend income. In fact, across the country, almost 70,000 do so 
(Shillington, 1999, p. 7).  
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of seniors who use them. Ontario’s nursing-home fee scale, for example, 
imposes effective tax rates of 100 per cent on modest-income seniors.
46 
We currently know little about how Canadians respond to the incentives 
these programs create, and comments about how they may respond in the 
future are necessarily highly speculative. Intuition and casual empiricism 
suggest that generous safety-net and income-replacement programs have 
tended to lower the participation rates of older people from the workforce. 
Efforts to calculate marginal benefits from staying in the workforce longer 
suggest that modifications to first- and second-pillar pensions might raise the 
average age of retirement (Baker et al., 2000). The United States, where 
Medicaid covers nursing-home expenses only for those with very low 
financial assets and incomes and insurers have designed annuities to allow 
seniors to qualify for this coverage,
47 provides hints about what more 
widespread understanding of health- and pension-related clawbacks might 
produce in Canada. Prudence suggests that policymakers should monitor 
carefully the impact of further changes to the medical safety net that target it 
to the less well-off, in order to avoid discouraging the work and saving that 
the Canadian pension and health systems will both require in the future. 
One way of muting the disincentives created by heavily means-tested first 
pillars, of course, is to oblige those who can provide for themselves to do so 
through a second-pillar system. The CPP and QPP show that Canadians 
accept such arrangements in the pensions and disability areas. WCBs and EI 
are further testimony to the acceptability of contributory schemes that at least 
look pre-funded, even if the economic reality is some-what different. Outside 
these plans, however, Canada has almost nothing by way of a second pillar in 
its health system. 
For the sake of building on existing foundations, it is tempting to suggest 
expanding one or more of the CPP/QPP, WCB and EI to accommodate the 
foreseeable increase in health-related demands by an older population in the 
future. But entitlement to the benefits of these programs and the obligation to 
fund them are contingent on workforce participation, and the prospect of a 
                                                             
46Horizontal inequities also arise in situations where, for example, assets in an 
RRSP would disqualify a senior from receiving a subsidy while a defined-benefit plan of 
equivalent value would not. 
47For couples, the annuities transfer income from the spouse requiring care to the 
one not requiring care; in the case of singles, the mechanism is a  “balloon” annuity that pays 
small monthly amounts and one large final payment at the end (Ann Davis, 2001).  
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relatively scarce workforce is what makes the fiscal implications of an aging 
population so daunting. 
An attractive, if institutionally more challenging, alternative is to think — 
along Clair Commission lines — of new provincial social insurance programs 
funded by, say, individual or family premiums. Such programs could provide 
participants with health coverage up to a threshold close to the current 
average per-capita amount spent by provincial governments on health 
services.
48 In the current period of reduced fiscal pressure, creating room for 
the required premiums by cutting personal income taxes would be straight-
forward. The extent to which entitlements in such plans would be earmarked 
for individual or family accounts would presumably vary depending on the 





The question of how much pre-funding makes sense for Canada’s first- and 
second-pillar pension and health systems is another area where gaps in 
knowledge make definitive judgements impossible. The current margin of 
rates of return on financial assets over rates of economic growth suggests that 
higher national saving would be good in general and that pre-funding is 
appropriate for new entitlement programs in particular. 
If this margin persists or widens as aging populations in Canada and 
abroad lower saving  rates and slow economic growth, continued general 
budget surpluses and accumulation of funds in existing and new programs 
makes sense. If, on the other hand, an aging population reduces the demand 
for new capital investment, lowering rates of return and allowing higher 
current consumption, pre-funding would be less attractive.
49 In view of these 
uncertainties, total elimination of regular government debt and full funding of 
all pension and health programs would be inappropriate goals. But prudence 
                                                             
48Nationally, per-capita spending on health services by provincial governments is 
around $2,000 annually. If entitlement cumulated in such plans, as it does in the CPP and 
QPP, older participants would, over time, build larger claims, matching in direction, if not in 
precise magnitude, the tendency for older people to use more health services. 
49Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000) provide a recent survey of U.S. debate over this 
issue, as well as some simulations. Their analysis is pertinent to Canada not only because 
U.S. and Canadian demographic prospects are broadly similar, but because the outcome of 
these forces in the United States will be critical in determining the environment in Canada.  
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and equity considerations — matching costs and benefits more fairly among 
generations (Sinn, 2000) — make pre-funding the extra costs associated with 
the baby boomers’ old age attractive. 
As noted already, some such pre-funding is arguably occurring with 
regard to OAS/GIS and the health safety net, and is definitely occurring in the 
CPP/QPP. Setting aside a portion of future budget surpluses in a designated 
health account could, if the saving in these accounts were not offset in other 
parts of the budget, extract some of the resources for their future health care 
from the boomers in advance, reducing the burden that would otherwise fall 
on their successors.
50 Similarly, ensuring that any new second-pillar health 
programs were pre-funded would ensure that they did not simply become a 
vehicle for the boomers to vote themselves new benefits at the expense of 





Two other foreseeable challenges for public policy in connection with 
pensions and health in the coming decades have to do with moving the age of 
eligibility for various transfers and services up from the current 65 
benchmark, and managing the incentives surrounding voluntary saving. 
Raising the standard age of eligibility is easy to envision, though over-
lapping programs and jurisdictions would make it complex to implement.
51 As 
other jurisdictions have done, Canada should prepare for a staged increase in 
the standard age of full eligibility for first- and second-pillar entitlements — 
two months per year over a 30-year period, say, or three months per year 
over a 20-year period, to increase it to age 70.
52 Matching increases would be 
                                                             
50Robson (2001) suggests that the federal government set up a Seniors Health 
Account in which to set aside part of its budget surpluses. In that proposal, income from 
these assets would flow to the provinces to help cover the health-related costs of their aging 
populations. 
51For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that a philosophically coherent 
case for eliminating all reference to age in pension and health programs exists. Age has 
proved, however, to be such a useful marker of eligibility for all manner of benefits and 
privileges, that it is hard to imagine doing away with it in the foreseeable future. 
52As was suggested by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries in the early 1990s (CIA, 
1993, pp. 17-19). Calculations using summary weighted dependency ratios to create an 
intergenerational wealth transfer index suggest less aggressive increases (Brown, 1995; 
Brown et al., 2001).  
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appropriate in provisions affecting RSPs. Such a co-ordinated increase would 
reduce disincentives to work for those approaching or past the age of 65, and 
should mitigate saving disincentives as well, by postponing the period of life 
when overlapping clawbacks essentially confiscate wealth. 
The second challenge is more multifaceted. Even more so than in the 
case of raising the eligibility age, there is a prior need for policymakers and 
Canadians generally to recognize the nature of the problem that looms. In 
private conversation, this author has encountered dismissals of the 
seriousness of his and others’ calculations of the implicit liability of future 
health care on the grounds that it is roughly offset by the stock of pension 
assets — a line of argument that implicitly assumes that those assets will be 
effectively confiscated by taxes and means-tested clawbacks of health 
benefits when they are converted into income. Effective tax rates close to 100 
per cent already affect many individuals: it would be a grave mistake to 
increase their numbers. And if the bulk of services currently covered by the 
medical safety net continue to be effectively unavailable for private purchase, 
a key motive for saving — the desire for a reasonable level of consumption of 
health goods and services in old age — will be undermined by the fact that 
there will effectively be nothing to buy. 
A multifaceted challenge naturally requires a multifaceted response. A 
good way of avoiding high and thick welfare walls for low- and middle-
income Canadians is to seek, as much as possible, to recover health-related 
benefits through the personal income tax at standard rates. Establishing a TEE 
alternative to the existing EET saving vehicles would allow modest income 
earners who are too old to enjoy a long period of tax-free compound-ing to 
save in a form that makes sense for them, foregoing tax relief on 
contributions during their working years when their marginal effective rates 
are comparatively low for the sake of relief on distributions during retirement 
when their marginal effective rates may be very high (Kesselman and 
Poschmann, 2001). 
As for the debate over private purchase of health care, suffice it to note 
again that patients can buy services the same as the public system covers, and 
providers can sell their services to both public and private purchasers, in 
many other countries where governments fund a larger share of total health-
related expenditures than they do in Canada. The extraordinary alarm these 
prospects raise among many Canadians inhibits intelligent debate. There are 
legitimate concerns about crowding out and cross-subsidization under these 
circumstances. Many Canadians are going to want to buy services they see as 
medically necessary, however, and at the time of writing, the coincidence of 
chronic labour unrest in the publicly funded system and sizeable funding 
increases makes it hard to  see them accepting existing prohibitions  
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indefinitely. Under those circumstances, learning how other countries control 
these problems makes more sense than simply insisting that no modifications 
to the current arrangement are possible.
53 For potential purchasers of medical 
services, moreover, an early start to refining the border between services that 
are publicly and privately purchased would be helpful for the simple reason 
that it will help them save wisely for their future needs (Globerman and 





Rather than attempting a detailed summary of this joint exploration of 
Canadian pension and health policy in a three-pillars framework, it seems best 
to close with a straightforward, perhaps obvious, observation. A good mixture 
of support and incentives in each of the pension and health systems is likely 
to produce beneficial effects in the other. Lifestyle maintenance programs that 
boost saving and encourage workforce participation will add to the resources 
that pay benefits and buy services. And a tax system that avoids penalizing 
saving for retirement or future health needs is likely to increase the proportion 
of the population that is willing and able to provide for themselves. 
Canada’s pension and health systems are currently a source of pride to 
policymakers and citizens alike. The pension system has over the past several 
decades benefited from ample resources and also from a precise matching of 
its various elements to its different objectives. The health system has 
benefited from even more ample resources and, as a result, has not 
undergone close scrutiny about the different purposes such social programs 
serve. Refocusing the debate over health care in a framework that 
distinguishes, as pension policy already does, three key objectives — a safety 
net, mandatory basic social insurance, and a framework for voluntary saving 
— offers two benefits. It promises a more fruitful resolution of current 
conundrums than does the confused and artificial debate over public versus 
private financing and delivery. And it can help ensure that the future evolution 
of Canada’s pension and health systems work in complementary fashion to 
deliver effective benefits in a sustainable way. 
 
                                                             
53The often-heard argument that any “two-tier” system will inevitably lead to 
wholesale privatization ignores the obvious fact that dual systems exist everywhere, and that 
the dominant trend of the past half-century has been for the share of health spending that is 
financed by governments to increase.  
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